Speaking of Silence by Minow, Martha
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
11-1-1988
Speaking of Silence
Martha Minow
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martha Minow, Speaking of Silence, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 493 (1988)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol43/iss2/7
BOOK REVIEW
Speaking of Silence
THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF VICTIMS. By Kristin Bumiller.* Baltimore, Maryland:
Johns Hopkins Press. 1988. Pp. 117.
Reviewed by Martha Minow**
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 493
II. REASONS FOR SILENCE .................................................... 496
A. The Rights Society: Stages of Complaining ............................ 496
B. The Uncivil Society: Complaining and Stigma ......................... 499
C. Beyond Society. Silence, Self-Sacrifice and Transcendence ............... 502
III. BEYOND SILENCE ........................................................ 505
A . Other Perspectives ................................................. 506
B. W hat to D o? ...................................................... 509
"We thought we could wear them down with our ability to suffer."
-Bernard Lafayette'
I. INTRODUCTION
Maybe you experienced it as a new kid in school. If other kids
picked on you, you were in a bind. You could complain to the
teacher, thereby marking yourself as an outsider who didn't play
along, or you could suffer in silence, preserving your self-sacrificing
dignity, but also your powerlessness. This dilemma still confronts
some adults who face discrimination by employers and landlords.
There are real costs of complaining. There may also be a kind of sur-
vival strategy in swallowing the injury, or "lumping it."2 To respond
to hurt with silence, however, leaves the source of hurt unchallenged.
* Kristin Bumiller is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins
University.
** Martha Minow is a Professor of Law at Harvard University. Many thanks to Joe
Singer, Mary Ann Glendon, Elizabeth Schneider, Vicky Spelman, and the participants in the
Harvard Law School 1988 Summer Research Program for their help.
1. Quoted in We Shall Overcome (PBS television documentary broadcast, Aug. 27, 1988)
(describing moments in the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s).
2. See Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-81) [hereinafter Naming, Blaming,
Claiming...].
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This is the insight behind the satirist's invocation: "Will all those
who feel powerless to influence events please signify by maintaining
their usual silence." 3
In The Civil Rights Society,4 Kristin Bumiller explores the conun-
drum of the discrimination victim by evoking the perspective of the
victims themselves. The author reports that a survey conducted in
1980 shows that many individuals who acknowledged that they had
experienced discrimination did not protest--either to the offender or
to anyone else.5 Although people fail to pursue grievances of all sorts,
the survey suggests that individuals who experience discrimination
are less inclined to pursue their grievances than are other potential
claimants. When asked why they fail to complain, many of these indi-
viduals blame themselves for not pursuing the problem, or explain
that they accept the situation as inevitable.6
To find deeper explanations, Bumiller interviewed eighteen peo-
ple who experienced discrimination but did not object. She reports
her findings in a subtle narrative, weaving what she learned from the
interviews into a thoughtful synthesis of historical, anthropological,
and psychological assessments of antidiscrimination law. She con-
cludes that, although antidiscrimination law promises to benefit vic-
tims, their own efforts to challenge discrimination through law
"usually end in defeat ... because the bonds of victimhood inhibit
3. Ashleigh Brilliant, Post Card (Brilliant Enterprises, Pot-Shots, No. 2076, 1981).
4. K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS (1988).
5. The Survey was conducted as part of the Civil Litigation Research project. See D.
TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER, & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION
RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (1983); Kritzer, Studying Disputes: Learning from the
CLRP Experience, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 503 (1980-81). The survey asked if respondents
"had experienced 'illegal or unfair treatment' because of their 'race, age, sex, handicaps, union
membership, or other things.'" K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 26. Some 5,000 households
were sampled and yielded 560 discrimination claims. "Preliminary analysis indicated that
approximately half of the aggrieved individuals did not make a claim to the other party, nearly
two-thirds did nothing further to rectify their perceived mistreatment, and only a very small
percentage had achieved successful resolution of their claims." Id. See Miller & Sarat,
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525
(1980-81).
6. See K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 27. Bumiller relies in part on Alan Freeman's
landmark work on antidiscrimination law, which identified the reliance of antidiscrimination
law on the perspective of the perpetrator rather than the victim. Freeman argues that it is the
actor's intention, rather than the consequences for others, that critically determines whether a
violation occurred. Id. at 64-66 (citing ALAN FREEMAN, Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical
Review, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 101 (D. Kairys ed. 1982)).
Implicitly accepting Freeman's criticism of antidiscrimination law, Bumiller uses the
perception of the ostensible "victim" to establish the benchmark of an experience with
discrimination-against which she assesses the decision to complain or not to complain. For
problems with this assumption, see infra Section II.
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challenges against the perpetrators." 7 Legal tools, impose divisions
between the powerful and the powerless, despite the rhetoric of equal-
ity.' The law assigns claimants to the role of the victim, scripted by
antidiscrimination doctrine. In the role of victim, the claimant must
assume a stance of powerlessness and defeat, deny the complexity of
her own experience, seek visibility, give control of the situation to
others, and disrupt and destabilize daily life and relationships.' The
victim must also reconstruct and relive the incident of discrimination.
The victim then runs the risks that others will not confirm the story,
or that the legal system in the end will grant not relief but further
humiliation. Those who choose to "lump it" and refrain from seek-
ing legal relief may exercise a sense of dignity, strength, and auton-
omy in the very choice not to complain.11 Because victims who
complain are often left with their own anger and confusion, victims
who decide not to complain have good reasons to adopt instead an
ethic of survival and sacrifice.12 Thus, Bumiller portrays a system of
legal redress that affords more opportunity for dignity and autonomy
when individuals who have claims decide not to pursue them than
when individuals who have claims choose to pursue them.
If this portrayal is plausible, it is a serious condemnation. The
problem with antidiscrimination laws then is not simply the usual dif-
ficulties with implementing public policies through courts and agen-
cies, nor even the obstacles posed by election returns that produce
administrative or judicial foot-dragging or interference with stated
policies. Rather, Bumiller suggests that the specific problem with
antidiscrimination laws is that they manifest and recreate some of the
harms they were supposed to redress. Such laws operate within a
world so hostile to the mission of redressing discrimination that they
assign the degrading role of victim to anyone who asserts the rights
that the laws set forth.
Some may challenge this thesis as empirically unsupported or as
a defeatist and pessimistic assessment. I ask, intead, what happens if
we locate this thesis within a broader array of reasons why people
with potential discrimination claims do not assert them? I suggest
that the decision not to complain looks both less exceptional and
more exceptional in this light. People generally complain less than
they could, given the incidence of infringements of legal rights. The
7. K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 83.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 60-65.
10. Id. at 104-05.
11. Id. at 69-71.
12. Id. at 83-84.
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special reasons for silence after discrimination incidents highlight the
limits of antidiscrimination law, and the pervasive patterns of power
within which discrimination may arise. I develop Bumiller's inquiry
into the strengths expressed by those who choose not to pursue dis-
crimination complaints and then consider whether, and how, antidis-
crimination laws should be changed, in light of potential claimants'
reasons for avoiding their use. My analysis is urged ahead by Bumil-
ler's reminder that social scientists and lawyers should try to under-
stand the perspective of those they study. 13 I will also consider,
however, how the laws do, and will, reflect other perspectives and
purposes, and the importance, then, of bearing witness.
II. REASONS FOR SILENCE
Law is not defined only by those who use it. Those who do not
come to the legal system with complaints are as critical to an under-
standing of law as those who do complain. Those who could com-
plain but do not mark the gateway between societal ideals and
practice. Sometimes the law is designed to make its actual use
unlikely: It may require proof that is hard to retrieve, or attorneys'
fees that exceed the amount of damages provided for by the legal
claim. Similarly, a legislature that provides an environmental protec-
tion program but also declines to fund it has, in effect, adopted the
policy of nonenforcement, despite the ostensibly espoused goals of the
legislation. When the unenforceability of a norm stems from the bur-
dens it places on those supposed to enforce it, a problem in implemen-
tation-or a problem in the feature of the design itself--emerges.
Either way, enforcement difficulties modify the norm and point
toward the real meaning of the law.
A. The Rights Society: Stages of Complaining4
The shortfall between espoused norms and their enforcement
may occur at many stages on the way to pursuing a grievance through
litigation."5 A review of these stages helps to locate the particular
13. Id. at 30. In general, Bumiller's commitment to tell the stories from the vantage point
of those who experience discrimination leads to a sensitive syntehsis of theories, but she
underplays the actual voices of the people interviewed for her study. They remain brief and
somewhat elusive sketches, rather than fully-developed narratives. In addition, Bumiller uses
the term "victim" which may impose an identity on people that they resist or find problematic
as descriptions of themselves. I will avoid using the word here except to describe how others
name them.
14. See generally Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... supra note 2.
15. These stages elaborate what Bumiller may mean when she notes that legal rights are
not self-enforcing, but instead, require action by those who would assert them. K. BUMILLER,
supra note 4, at 111. Of course, the enforcement of some legal rights is entrusted exclusively,;
[Vol. 43:493
SPEAKING OF SILENCE
reasons for silence discovered in Bumiller's study of people who
experienced discrimination and demonstrates that there are many
more reasons for refraining from litigation besides avoiding the pain
of the victim role.
First, the individual must perceive an injury to himself, and per-
ceive it as something beyond his own fault or his inevitable fate.
Many psychological, religious, and political world views lead people
to conclude, in contrast, that whatever happens to them is their own
responsibility, or else the dictates of a political or divine authority
beyond their control.' 6 For example, one study showed how women
in a predominantly Baptist community tended not to seek divorces,
even when they found their marriages in trouble, because their reli-
gious community urged them to come to terms with negative feelings
by redefining their own role, internalizing the conflict, preferring self-
sacrifice, and addressing obligations to the whole group.' 7  Even an
expert in litigation, Louis Nizer, noted that "[w]hen a man points a
finger at someone else, he should remember that four of his fingers are
pointing at himself."' 8 Complaining about another's conduct, there-
fore, becomes entangled with self-blame, and some may find this rea-
son enough to avoid accusing another.'9 Moreover, the danger of
or in part, to public officials, such as attorney generals and prosecutors. The enforcement of
other legal rights is entrusted exclusively to the private parties who would assert them.
Variations in procedural rules facilitating private actions or eliciting public help in enforcing
private rights increase the likelihood of enforcement.
16. Different groups within society, and different groups at contrasting historical
moments, may frame the question of fate versus individual entitlement differently. See L.
FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1986) (describing shift from conception of injuries as natural to
injuries as harms for which the individual is entitled to redress); K. LUKER, ABORTION AND
THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 196-97 (1984) (comparing world view of right to life
advocates, who think fate preordains their life opportunities, with world view of right to
choose advocates).
17. C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER AND COMMUNITY IN AN
AMERICAN TOWN 49, 63-64 (1986).
18. II AN EDITOR'S TREASURY: A CONTINUING ANTHOLOGY OF PROSE, VERSE, AND
LITERATURE CURIOSA 1395 (H. Mayes ed. 1968). See Coates & Penrod, Social Psychology
and the Emergence of Disputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 655 (1980-81) (A study suggesting that
people are more likely to blame themselves than they are to blame others.); Freeman, Racism,
Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 295, 368-71 (1988) (describing studies about self-blame among people who have not
succeeded in America as reflections of an ideology of equal opportunity that masks class-based
hierarchy).
19. The risk of self-blame as a reason for quiescence is further amplified by the possibility
that human beings are prone to hierarchical patterns of authoritarianism and submission. See
West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political
Visions of Franz Kajfa and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); West, Submission,
Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1449 (1986). But see
Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1431 (1986).
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working up hope and then losing may seem more painful than the
process of giving up before hoping.2" Thus, perceiving an injury as
objectionable and actionable is actually a difficult hurdle for many
people.2'
Even for those who perceive a harm as something to challenge,
the second stage requires recognizing that harm as a legal violation,
and as something worth discussing with a lawyer or some other guide
through the legal system. This stage is especially difficult where the
injury represents a harm newly recognized by law, or where the injury
occurs within the pattern of ongoing daily relationships that may
seem removed from both legal commands and legal redress. There
also may be practical and economic barriers, for the individual must
find a lawyer or an advocate to discuss and assess the complaint.
Most people do not have a lawyer on call, and further, most individu-
als cannot afford one.22
Even if the individual can find a legal advocate, he may well drop
out during the third stage. At this stage, the lawyer evaluates the
claim in light of prior case law, assesses the potential financial and
emotional costs of a lawsuit, and assesses the strength and credibility
of the plaintiff. Here, cold, hard facts, rather than the more subtle
difficulty of the victim role, may dissuade the individual from suing.
The brutality of litigation, and the rational judgment that it is not
worth pursuing, were well-communicated long ago when Voltaire
announced, "I was never ruined but twice: once when I lost a lawsuit,
and once when I won one. ' '23 The burdens of litigation to both plain-
tiffs and defendants have been a topic of much discussion throughout
this century.24 When it comes to antidiscrimination law, the costs of
litigating have become quite severe. In fact, most lawyers knowledg-
able about Title VII claims are likely to advise an individual against
bringing a discrimination suit because the sheer costs of discovery in
such suits often swamp the value of the claim in its undeveloped
20. Cf. R. Weissbourd, Moral Shock: The Disillusionment of Vietnam Veterans
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1987) (copy on file at
Professor Martha Minow's office, Harvard Law School) (Psychologist evaluates psychological
burdens of disillusionment, and how disillusionment can happen only after one has hopes or
ideals.).
21. These obstacles to perceiving injury exist independently of the reluctance to assume
the role of the victim that is central to Bumiller's analysis. See, e.g., K. BUMILLER, supra note
4, at 98-103.
22. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. I AN EDITOR'S TREASURY: A CONTINUING ANTHOLOGY OF PROSE, VERSE, AND
LITERARY CURIOSA 1032 (H. Mayes ed. 1968).
24. See generally L. Friedman, supra note 16; Steele, The Historical Context of Small
Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 295 (Spring 1981).
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state.25
At any of these stages, the individual may conclude that the time
and emotional energy that litigation demands will unduly interfere
with ongoing life, and place too great a burden on not just that indi-
vidual, but also on his family and friends. Thus, people may "lump"
their discrimination claims, due to a sense that the injury cannot be
redressed. They may fail to connect an insult at work to a legal right.
They may lack an ability to locate a willing lawyer, or a lawyer's
assessment may dissuade them from pursuing their claim. These rea-
sons may well apply to any legal claim, not just to discrimination
claims. At the same time, these reasons, which lead people to "lump
it" should be understood as part of society's legal norms concerning
when discrimination is, and is not, countenanced. In addition, the
lawyer's probable assessment that most individual discrimination
claims are not worth pursuing is a direct translation of the legal sys-
tem's past results in the area. The actual societal norm about discrim-
ination, in practice, provides a less stringent ban than the statutes
facially seem to proscribe.
B. The Uncivil Society: Complaining and Stigma
Any complainer risks being labeled, or even shunned, as a trou-
blemaker. As much as our cultural myths celebrate the rugged indi-
vidual and the courageous iconoclast, we simultaneously warn against
rocking the boat and making a fuss. Indeed, the very values of indi-
vidualism and courage devalue sensitivity to the slings and arrows of
chance or bad manners.
There are special additional problems accompanying some com-
plaints where the very act of recounting what happened can be newly
painful. Survivors of rape may feel so humiliated by the experience
that they would prefer not to talk about it. Others correctly fear
renewed humiliation if they have to discuss the experience with stran-
gers, and especially if they must face an adversary process that puts
their own credibility and reputation into question.26 Here, com-
plaining may promise less than silence for the person who wants to
retain control, privacy, and a sense of self-respect.
Similarly, people who have faced discrimination may view com-
plaining about it as more risky than silence. They, too, may find that
discussing the incident is likely to reopen the wounds, cede control to
others, or expose them to painful scrutiny and skeptism by others.
The person who complains of discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
25. See, e.g., M. HEINS, CUTTING THE MUSTARD (1987).
26. See generally S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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or another significant personal trait may encounter spoken or implied
disapproval from peers and coworkers. It may be difficult to bear dis-
approving judgments that in effect tell the complaining party: you are
a troublemaker, you are disloyal, you are different from us, just as we
always suspected. Moreover, complaining about discrimination
means you are weak, you are dependent upon others to protect you,
and you are a victim. This is in part what Bumiller means when she
identifies how antidiscrimination rules provide for a social construc-
tion of the complainant as a victim, a role that can be confining and
even humiliating. In addition to all the other stages at which a poten-
tial litigant may fail to pursue a complaint, the discrimination com-
plainant faces the additional question: Do I want to risk the forced
visibility, the label of a troublemaker? 27
I The survivor of discrimination who contemplates complaining
about it faces still further problems of stigma. If I claim that I was
discriminated against on the basis of a trait that has in the past carried
a stigma, I wave the flag that I am a different or deviant person. I
may be stigmatized not only for being a complainer, but also for being
a person with traits that give rise to discrimination, traits that have
been despised or devalued by powerful people in the past.
The problem of risking stigma by complaining extends beyond
the context of antidiscrimination litigation. When a particular trait or
status carries stigmatizing consequences, people understandably do
not want to identify themselves by that trait or status, even to claim a
benefit supposedly designed to relieve the burdens of the past. For
example, some members of minority groups object to questions on
application forms for college or for employment that ask about minor-
ity status because they want neither positive nor negative considera-
tion on this basis. They understandably fear that any continued
distinction drawn on the basis of their race or ethnicity will perpetu-
ate the use of a trait that, in the past, has deprecated or degraded
them, or people like them. Similarly, some female employees refuse to
accept maternity leave or part-time work options following childbirth
on the grounds that such special benefits will stigmatize them at work,
27. Bumiller suggests that complaining means accepting the constraints of the victim role,
which also "transforms the conflict into an internal contest to reconcile a positive self-image
with the image of oneself as a powerless and defeated victim." K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at
52. See also id. at 83-84, where Bumiller observed that:
The promise of antidiscrimination law is that it will benefit the victim
against the more powerful perpetrator of discrimination. These struggles usually
end in defeat, however, because the bonds of victimhood inhibit challenges
against the perpetrators. The result is that victims internalize the power struggle
by submitting to ruthlessness and their own anger and confusion.
[Vol. 43:493
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and identify them as second-class or less than top-notch employees.
A woman who receives special media attention because she holds a
job only men have previously held may object to that attention, espe-
cially if the reporters focus on her appearance or other aspects of a
gender stereotype. Objecting on any of these grounds, however, con-
tinues to identify the individual with the trait she prefers to make
unimportant.
All of these people face what I call the "dilemma of difference. "28
They face a dilemma because the negative social meaning of a particu-
lar trait of difference lies so much beyond their control that their very
efforts to object to negative treatment on that basis may confront
them with further undesirable consequences. I emphasize here the
"social meaning" of difference because the trait may be real, but its
negative consequences in people's lives derive from cultural attitudes
and practices. We tend to talk as though the difference sits inside the
person who diverges from the majority or an unstated norm. The
difference, however, is really a comparison, a comparison drawn by
some to degrade others. Where a particular pattern of differences
between people signals deviance and inferiority for some, efforts both
to deny and to recognize their difference may reexpose them to
stigma. Ignoring the differences between a child who speaks English
and one who speaks Spanish may disable the Spanish speaker in a
class conducted in English. On the other hand, identifying the differ-
ence and providing specialized instruction may segregate that student
from others, while implying or assuring delayed achievement in the
lessons taught to the other students. So long as a norm is embedded
within the major institutions that make certain traits abnormal, both
identifying and denying those traits may harm the person who seems
different.
In the face of such adverse situations, it should not be surprising
when people who have been called "different" by others prefer to
remain silent about harms related to that "difference." Bringing
attention to their difference could create new injury. In addition to all
the other reasons for refraining from litigation-the failure to per-
ceive the injury, or the lawyers' or clients' judgment that the suit is
too costly financially and emotionally-people who have experienced
discrimination face a special risk in complaining. They risk encoun-
tering further humiliation in the victim role designed for the
complainer.
28. See Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special
Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 157 (1985); Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
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Bumiller's special contribution is to show how silence and sub-
mission may seem a better alternative to such people, even though
silence leaves their past and future injuries unaddressed. Even if
silence may register complicity or submission to continuing patterns
of deprecation and discrimination, deciding not to complain may save
the costs of the victim role. Moreover, as Bumiller explores,2 9 such a
decision may grant a moment of autonomy, control, self-sacrifice, and
even transcendence in a world that has dealt out few opportunities for
such expressions of character. While Bumiller's argument should be
tempered in light of the range of reasons why people generally decline
to pursue claims, I find a powerful insight in her inquiry into self-
sacrifice and transcendence. Here, the depth of dilemmas of differ-
ence is matched only by the resourceful strengths of the human spirit.
C. Beyond Society: Silence, Self-Sacrifice and Transcendence
Sometimes silence, submission, and self-sacrifice can be expres-
sions of strength, self-respect, and autonomy. Sometimes decisions
not to complain reflect a moral universe where these qualities of char-
acter count more than redressing a particular injury. Sometimes deci-
sions not to complain reflect a position of such exclusion from the
community that only the act of choosing to affirm such exclusion
affords a sense of dignity. A real contribution of Bumiller's study is
her effort to describe these times. She draws, for example, on Barring-
ton Moore's study of ascetics, untouchables, and concentration camp
prisoners who accepted pain with a kind of moral authority in the
face of hugely degrading circumstances.3a Moore concludes that such
people demonstrated a "capacity to resist powerful and frightening
social pressures to obey oppressive or destructive rules or com-
mands. ' 3 1 Bumiller comments that "[w]hat appear to be acts of total
submission may in fact preserve the remnants of human autonomy. 3a2
For some, choosing not to complain may preserve a sense of auton-
omy otherwise threatened with suppression.
Moments of individual transcendence through silence or self-sac-
rifice in some ways are more glorious and ennobling than anything
offered through the tedious process of litigation. In both history and
fiction, stories of silence in the face of degradation, and self-sacrifice in
the face of oppression, enlarge our sense of the human spirit. Such
29. See K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 69-95.
30. Id. at 70 (discussing B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND
REVOLT (1978)).
31. B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT, at 13.
32. K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 70.
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moments also expose how specific social structures make silence or
self-sacrifice noble alternatives. Silence in the face of oppressive harm
seems transcendent when other routes of expression are futile. When
people could, instead, register legal complaints, their silence marks
points of perceived futility within the law.
Silence under these circumstances may be a form of self-sacrifice
or submission to insult. Yet self-sacrifice is inspiring when done to
avoid worse consequences for oneself or for others. Self-sacrifice is
uplifting when it alone allows a chance for self-control and dignity.
Self-sacrifice is dignifying when it redraws seemingly immutable lines
of difference, and it is transcendent when it discloses the hidden
power of the powerless.
Some examples of self-sacrifice in fiction help to highlight the
remarkable discovery of human freedom and strength in situations
that seem to offer no chance for dignity or autonomy. It is as if giving
away what seems one's own last shred of self breaks open the prison
of external oppression. Thus, in Andre Malraux's Man's Fate,33 a
novel about the Chinese revolution, a group of war revolutionaries
await their deaths in prison. One has managed to smuggle along a
cyanide capsule, which, in this desperate context, represents the last
chance for self-control and for freedom: its possessor could at least
choose the moment and the means of his own death. In what can
only be understood as an act of enormous generosity and self-sacrifice,
its owner gives the capsule to two prisoners to share; there was only
enough for two.34 It is a sign of both his noble spirit and the extreme
desperation of their circumstance, that giving an instrument for self-
destruction could be a moment of self-denial and human connection.
In The Color Purple,35 Alice Walker creates a moment of dra-
matic tension when Adam, a young American black man, falls in love
with Tashi, a young African woman, during his stay in Africa with
his missionary mother. The African woman decides that she must
undergo her tribal ceremony which will permanently scar her face.36
She tells the young man that she cannot join him in America because
her scars would be too stigmatizing.37 He responds by returning with
scars identical to hers and assures her that whatever happens to her in
America will also happen to him.3  Here, he finds a power, even
while powerless in the face of her obligations. It is a power to sacrifice
33. A. MALRAUX, MAN'S FATE (H. Chevalier trans. 1934).
34. Id. at 326-28.
35. A. WALKER, THE COLOR PURPLE (1982).
36. Id. at 213-14.
37. Id. at 243.
38. Id. at 243-44.
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himself, to use his own choice to embrace the difficulty others will
place upon her; it is a power to redraw the lines of difference so that
they will not divide him from the one he loves.
Marge Piercy's Woman on the Edge of Time 39 introduces a dis-
tant world that is either a Utopia or the deluded fantasy of a mentally
ill woman. In this world, all human reproduction is managed through
test tubes; women may not conceive or deliver children, although they
biologically could. When asked why women are willing to give up
these joys, a spokeswoman replies that the power over conception and
childbirth is the only power women have, and as long as the biological
difference gives women a power that men do not have, then men and
women can never be equal." Sacrificing this one power of their own,
then, is a first step toward achieving the world of mutual respect that
they seek.
, In a chillingly gradual revelation, Toni Morrison's Beloved 41
turns out to be the ghost of the daughter killed decades before by her
mother Sethe, an escaped slave. Sethe preferred to destroy her
beloved child with her own hands, rather than expose her to the white
men coming to return them both to slavery. She had faith that the
child would be safe in heaven, and in that faith, she sacrificed what
she loved.42
These moments of self-sacrifice represent desperate efforts to
avoid something that seems worse. They reveal surprising and coura-
geous preferences for companionship over autonomy,43 equality over
power, love over equality, and dignity over life. In these moments,
the characters seized latitude for choice and control, when none
seemed to exist. They redressed power imbalances when they them-
selves seemed powerless. They redrew a line of difference by putting
themselves on the side of deviance, stigma, or powerlessness, and by
giving up the small advantage they had, in order to help another, or to
deny anyone beyond themselves the authority to arrest their own
values.
The realm of the human spirit evoked in these stories soars above
the mundane cruelties of employment or housing discrimination but
hints at the dignity of those who withstand those injuries. For them,
39. M. PIERCY, WOMAN ON THE EDGE OF TIME (1976).
40. Id. at 98.
41. T. MORRISON, BELOVED (1987).
42. Ironically, the murder propelled the child's ghost into clinging to, delighting with, and
nearly destroying the mother in her later years.
43. This is fair only when given a definition of autonomy that presumes independence and
solitude. For a contrasting conception, see J. Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy (forthcoming,
YALE J. LAW & FEMINISM).
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too, silence and self-sacrifice in search of dignity help to explain deci-
sions not to complain or decisions to submit to injuries. If people who
experience discrimination do not sue because silence and self-sacrifice
are the only alternatives that preserve their autonomy and dignity,
then there is a serious defect in the antidiscrimination rules them-
selves. Perhaps some people do not sue because they want to avoid
something that seems worse. Perhaps they seek to obtain control or
preserve their dignity, or redress an imbalance of power by choosing
their own powerlessness. Perhaps they sacrifice themselves to redraw
a dividing line of difference, refusing the power of others to assign
difference by choosing their own meanings.' Perhaps decisions not
to complain reflect such powerlessness that only the act of choosing to
affirm such powerlessness affords a sense of dignity.
We should not forget the other reasons why people decline to
complain-because they fail to perceive the injury or its legal dimen-
sions, because they cannot obtain legal counsel, or because they find
the financial and emotional costs excessive. If, however, people
decline to complain because that choice offers a small chance to avoid
something worse, to protect their dignity, or to exercise the bare
autonomy of affirming the fate otherwise assigned to them, then we
have in the practice of antidiscrimination law stories like searing fic-
tion. Like the fascist enemy, the intolerant majority, the jealous men,
and the slave-catchers in the works of fiction, the legal rules create
situations in which submission offers a paradoxical chance for dignity;
and like those fictional enemies, the antidiscrimination laws and the
society producing them stand condemned.
III. BEYOND SILENCE
Like Kristin Bumiller, I have tried to consider the problems of
antidiscrimination law from the perspective of those it was supposed
to, but does not, benefit. From this perspective, antidiscrimination
laws, in practice, may reiterate stigmas they were supposed to redress
by constructing an undesirable victim role for anyone who complains
under the laws, and by exposing the complainant to risks of humilia-
44. Sometimes, objecting to a label assigned by others only gives more power to those
others and to the stigma attached to that label. In those circumstances, accepting the label
may be a form of resistance. The courage to resist in this way can be very costly, as some
writers and actors discovered when they refused to cooperate with the House Un-American
Activities Committee during the Hollywood black-listing days. See also Frug, McCarthyism
and Critical Legal Studies (Book Review), 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665 (1987) (reviewing
E. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES (1986), and
discussing parallels between McCarthyism and current issues in law school hiring and
promotion practices).
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tion and additional failure. Furthermore, from this perspective, it is
important to view decisions not to bring discrimination complaints as
acts of strength and dignity by the individuals and as condemnations
of the laws supposedly designed to help them. On a very practical
level, those who internalize the conflicts by "lumping it" are suscepti-
ble to health risks, evidenced by the higher blood pressure and heart
attack rates of members of minority groups in this country. When
individuals fail to complain about the discrimination that they experi-
ence the entire nation misses opportunities to correct and deter pat-
terns of discrimination that may injure others in the future. Yet,
there are other perspectives relevant to antidiscrimination laws and
patterns of complaining and silence.
A. Other Perspectives
When considering the perspectives of those lacking enough
power to complain through official channels, it would be wrong to
ignore other perspectives that in the past have been at least as signifi-
cant in defining the shape of the law. One contrasting perspective is
the "potential perpetrator" perspective-the perspective of the
employers, landlords, and other potential defendants in discrimina-
tion suits. Such people may reject some perceptions of discrimination
expressed by people like those studied in Bumiller's book. Such inci-
dents, they may argue, arise from undue sensitivities, or unjustified
efforts to use civil rights laws in order to harrass others or to gain an
unfair advantage in the economic competition of the job or housing
markets. From this perspective, the fact that many people who per-
ceive discrimination do not complain may help to correct these risks
of erroneous perceptions by offsetting legitimate claims against mis-
guided ones.
Another perspective can be called the "legal administration" per-
spective. From this perspective, the law should be carefully crafted to
avoid false incentives for lawsuits that are not warranted, or that
should be resolved through less costly means. Thus, cases at the mar-
gin should be discouraged, and disputes in general should be chan-
neled away from full-fledged litigation. In addition, the "legal
administration" perspective opposes the distortion that can occur
when a claimant changes the facts in order to fit the legal requisites
and to increase chances of prevailing in court. For a good example of
this problem, consider prisoners applying for parole from prison who
learn about a factor- such as marital status-that the administrators
use in granting applications for parole. Because married prisoners, as
a statistical matter, have performed better on parole than single pris-
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oners, the adminstrators have viewed marriage as a helpful factor. If
inmates learn about this, and get married in order to improve their
chances of parole, however, they have manipulated a factor and
undermined its factual usefulness to the administrators.4" Similar
administrative concerns argue against designing antidiscrimination
laws in ways that would give parties, on either side, greater control
over the conduct that becomes germane to an ultimate lawsuit. Obvi-
ously, this administrative concern cuts in the opposite direction of the
parties' own interests in enhancing their own autonomy and control,
both in and beyond litigation.
The confluence and conflict among these perspectives may help
to explain the problems with antidiscrimination laws described by
Bumiller. As written, and as implemented, laws do-and will con-
tinue to-reflect other perspectives and purposes besides the view-
point of those injured by the discriminatory acts of others. Silence,
sacrifice, and resistance will remain important responses because the
system is not designed with only victims in mind. I agree with Bumil-
ler that the problem is not merely simple "flaws in the system,""
meaning the system of legal rules and procedures. Bumiller argues
that the problem lies in the law's distance from people's daily lives
and social roles, and people's perceptions of law as hostile and
disruptive.47
For me, there is something even more significant than people's
perceptions that the law may not serve them to redress discrimina-
tion. The problem is not perception, but fact.4" Often, in fact, law is
not a fruitful mechanism for objecting. The system serves many con-
trasting and conflicting purposes. The complainant becomes sub-
jected to a kind of scrutiny and doubt that can be brutal, given the
system's commitment to the perspectives of legal administrators and
potential defendants that operate alongside its commitment to provide
remedies for discrimination. Moreover, in the specific context of
racial and gender discrimination, the legal system historically reflects
and reinforces the biases of the larger society. Judges, prosecutors,
45. See generally Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1437-42 (1979)
(analyzing the use of predictive factors that induce, reward, or punish).
46. K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 110.
47. Id. at 110-11.
48. In fact, most cases are settled rather than taken to trial, so the chances of full
vindication in a courtroom are very small, even for those who do pursue legal relief. See
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983)
(considering courts as arenas for compulsory bargaining, rather than avenues for pursuing
justice).
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clerks, juries, police officers, and lawyers often share the negative atti-
tudes that trap members of minorities in dilemmas of difference.
Even glimpses of reform have too often fallen prey to the larger pat-
terns that herald one kind of person as the norm in society, and
subordinate others as inferior.49 Potential claimants, therefore, are
not often wrong to perceive that pursuing a lawsuit could be disrup-
tive and abrasive without much probability of success.
The accuracy of these perceptions may reflect a failure of antidis-
crimination law to register one more perspective. At least some peo-
ple who are neither subjected to discrimination, nor actively engaged
in it, actually want to live in a society where discrimination on the
basis race and gender does not occur. Perhaps some of these people
believe in this ideal society strongly enough to be willing to participate
in the changes in our society that might make their own lives less
comfortable or familiar. I fear that this perspective has been
shortchanged by political leaders who say that we have done enough
already, and by the practice of antidiscrimination law that effectively
communicates that it is unwise, and even humiliating, to complain.
The present balance of perspectives in society reinforces neither
the perspectives of this group nor the perspectives of those subjected
to racial or gender discrimination. Until the balance of perspectives
shifts and produces greater commitments of public resources and
communal authority in this direction, tinkering with the laws against
discrimination will make little difference.50 The ability of some to suf-
fer,51 however, will not, by itself, wear down the patterns of discrimi-
nation. Efforts to reform antidiscrimination law are not unimportant.
Minimally, preserving the current balance against forces of reaction
remains important. Furthermore, although I do not believe that legal
changes alone can change the larger patterns behind the "dilemma of
difference,"52 the arena of law reform is no less viable than other
places for pursuing a larger strategy of changing social attitudes and
sensitizing more people to the experiences and injuries of discrimina-
tion. Those who sue as discrimination plaintiffs, however, should be
understood as foot soldiers in an often brutal struggle for change.
They are not merely individual claimants seeking their due, even if
the format of an individual lawsuit makes it seem that way. This may
49. See generally D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) (exploring paradoxical defeats of civil rights reform strategies);
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
50. See FREEMAN, supra, note 6.
51. See We Shall Overcome, supra note 1.
52. See supra note 28.
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be the most telling sign of Bumiller's claim that. the victim role
harmfully constrains discrimination complainants. By treating the
plaintiff as an isolated person, the form of individual lawsuits under-
plays the conflict of group-based perspectives at work in each societal
consideration of allegations of discrimination.
B. What to Do?
The analysis of the legal system that we adopt surely affects the
changes we may recommend. From Bumiller's analysis, there is little
that can be done. Her condemnation of antidiscrimination law
exposes as unrealistic the hope that law could empower those whom it
treats as victims. Bumiller suggests that when white women and
minorities bring discrimination complaints, "they assume a role more
like the accused defendant in a criminal trial than like the ally of gov-
ernment prosecutors."53 Like criminal defendants, the discrimination
plaintiffs may face an assumption that they are to blame. Further,
like criminal defendants, discrimination plaintiffs face pressure to set-
tle or to cede their claims because the costs of pursuing them are sim-
ply too high.54  Bumiller argues that "[t]he worthiness of the
discrimination claim is never evaluated when persons who experience
discrimination do not transcend the burdens of their victimhood.""
I suggest a different analogy. It is not perfect but it highlights
another dimension: The discrimination complainant is like the victim
of a violent, shattering crime--one that most nonvictims who can do
so proceed to ignore, despite its pervasiveness. The direct target of
discrimination has less luxury. If there is to be any societal response,
she, like a victim of a violent crime, must help prosecute the defend-
ant, but she may herself be brutalized by the adversarial process of
litigation. The emotional rigors of litigation can be destructive even
to those it is supposed to help. The adversary system subjects even
the victim-witness of a crime to the ravages of cross-examination and
the humiliations of an assigned role in someone else's play. Eloquent
accounts by rape victims depicting the trial as an additional rape are a
vivid example of this fact. Litigation is not a pleasant way to solve
problems, and its processes are not guidelines for settling disputes, but
are instead the rules for the worst-case scenario. Those rules provide
the relentless opportunity to scrutinize all perspectives, while placing
the burden of proof on those who would change what has happened,
given the otherwise prevailing pattern of circumstances. The ligita-
53. K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 111.
54. See Galanter, supra note 49.
55. K. BUMILLER, supra note 4, at 111.
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tion process is commited to expressing and protecting not only the
complainant's perspective, but also the perspectives of the alleged per-
petrator and the legal administrator. This commitment makes the
courtroom, and its attendant machinations, a crucible in which all
parties and witnesses face heat and friction.
Prosecutors, and society in general, need the help of crime vic-
tims in order to pursue criminals and bring them to justice. If the
burdens are too great, victims will not participate, or will not partici-
pate effectively. Victims of crime who have been through the system,
and their advocates, have effectively persuaded governments around
the country to organize and finance victim-witness assistance pro-
grams.5 6 These programs do not alter the system, but instead try to
help these people through it. Like the victims of crimes, people who
have experienced discrimination are themselves innocent, but they
risk emotional degradation and exhaustion if they participate in
enforcing the law. Of course, unlike victims of crime, the discrimina-
tion victims must often serve as the "prosecutor" by initiating a civil,
rather than a criminal, action, and by acting as the party seeking legal
redress.57 Furthermore, in the role of the party pursuing the action,
the plaintiff must finance the case and provide the momentum to push
it through the system.
In the role as the injured witness to the violation of a societal
norm-like the victim-witness to a crime-the discrimination plaintiff
may need something equivalent to the victim-witness advocates pro-
grams developed in many jurisdictions. Access to support groups
composed of others in similar situations, and access to an experienced
guide who can explain the system and help the individual negotiate a
pathway through its emotional rigors, would be two important fea-
tures of an admittedly limited program. This suggestion, like victim-
witness programs for survivors of rape and other violent crimes, does
not change the essential features of the litigation system, nor does it
alter the balance of the system's competing goals. Victim-witness pro-
grams may, indeed, help to legitimate the brutality of systems that
instead need to be changed. In addition, an assistance program for
discrimination complainants may acknowledge the reasons why many
56. See, e.g., Lubet, When Good People Do Good Things: The Ethical Dimension of
Judicial Involvement in Victim Assistance Programs, 69 JUDICATURE 199 (Dec./Jan. 1986).
57. There may be a criminal prosecution in some instances of discrimination, and there
may be a civil action initiated by the victim for damages against someone who committed a
crime. The dual criminal and civil systems serve overlapping functions, and redundancy itself
may promote more accurate results and more reliable checks on centers of power. See Cover,
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 639 (1981).
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people, quite rationally, decide in favor of self-sacrifice, rather than
pursue legal redress. An assistance program may, nonetheless,
encourage some to rethink that choice, and may afford a greater
chance of dignity and transcendence within the legal process. And it
may, like memorable fiction, and like Bumiller's memorable book,
provide witness to the extraordinary capacities of human beings faced
with no good choices.
